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REASSESSING THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ORIGINALISM 
Lee Borocz-Johnson*
JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2018). PP. 464. HARDCOVER $35.00. 
SHLOMO SLONIM, FORGING THE AMERICAN NATION, 1787?1791: JAMES 
MADISON AND THE FEDERALIST REVOLUTION (PALGRAVE MACMILLAN US
2017). PP. 273. PAPERBACK $29.99. EBOOK $19.99. 
The two books under review focus upon the framing, ratification, and coming into 
effect of the United States Federal Constitution, but in very different ways. James Madison 
is a central player in both stories, and each book in its own way testifies to the continuing 
fruitfulness of studying the political and constitutional thought of James Madison, 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????
book Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention.1 James Madison has 
become an important focal point for reevaluations of the American founding era and the 
framing of the Constitution, and these reevaluations are of interest to legal scholars and 
political scientists as well as historians. 
Shlomo Slonim presents in Forging the American Nation, 1787–1791: James 
Madison and the Federalist Revolution ?????????????????????????????????????????? ????
founding era in devising and advocating for a model of a strong central government vested 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
begins ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
the Articles of Confederation to establish a sufficiently strong central government, and 
then runs through the Philadelphia convention, the ratification debates, and the first 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 took place during the 
                                                          
*Lee Borocz-Johnson is a graduate student in the Johns Hopkins University department of history. Primarily an 
intellectual historian, his research centers around the complex relationships between transforming ideas about 
race, class, gender, empire, education, citizenship, political participation, and constitutionalism in the age of 
revolutions, c. 1760?1850. 
 1. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON?S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015). 
 2. SHLOMO SLONIM, FORGING THE AMERICAN NATION, 1787?1791: JAMES MADISON AND THE FEDERALIST 
REVOLUTION xv (2017). It should be noted that Slonim makes a point of indicating that he came upon Bilder?s
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drafting and ratification of the United States ????????????????????????????????? ?????????
scheme for a robust, powerful government as laid down in the Virginia Plan was reined in 
and shored up throughout the Philadelphia Convention, the ratification debates, and the 
First C????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ????? ????????????????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????
necessary compromises made with two blocs of states, i.e. slave states and small states, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
government with the ability to veto any state legislation.3 Slonim conceives of the slave 
states and small states as collective interest groups in order to emphasize his contention 
that states-rights arguments played virtually no part of the federalist system devised at the 
Philadelphia convention, an important point for his argument at the end of the book about 
federalism and the original meaning of the Constitution.4 Compromises with these two 
state blocs at the convention were followed by compromises with antifederalists during 
the ratification debates, which led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 
Slonim positions the doctrine of implied powers as the driving force in his story. 
During the Confederation period, Madison tried to argue, to little avail, that the Articles 
granted implied powers to the Congress,5 and in the lead up to the Philadelphia Convention 
he and his Virginia colleagues had crafted the Virginia Plan precisely so as to grant the 
central government the wide latitude of implied powers that it effectively lacked under the 
Articles. Slonim argues that it was the slave states, in particular, who were antagonistic to 
wide government latitude and who worked to restrain the aspirations of Madison and his 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
central government would take, and which powers would be vested in it, that created the 
federal structure of the United States government. Importantly for Slonim, the judiciary 
was not the key to the federal structure of government devised by the Philadelphia 
convention. The judiciary was, according to Slonim, a by-product and a partial stand-in 
for Madi????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????????? ?????????? ?ut not a component of American 
Federalism.6 ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ????????????
b???????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ????????????????? ???? ???????????? ?????????????? ???? ??????????????? ??????????
Madison and his colleagues, and how they subsequently shored up their vision of a 
powerful central government in the wake of these compromises. Small states were wary 
of a strong central government in which the legislature would be constituted in proportion 
to population, a proposition which they saw as guaranteeing that they would always be 
dominated by the large states?thus the Connecticut Compromise, creating a senate in 
which each state would be represented equally. According to Slonim, the contributions of 
                                                          
Madison’s Hand after his book went to press, and thus he could not incorporate Bilder?s findings into his 
argument. Id. at xx. 
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Id. at 41. 
 5. Id. at 17 n.10. 
 6. Id. at 71. Slonim?s account is thus counter to ALISON LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010). 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????7
The slave states successfully shored up their own power and influence by means of the 
Three-Fifths Compromise, which increased their representation in Congress by having 
three fifths of their enslaved population count for purposes of congressional 
representation. Further, both slave states and small states pushed for the electoral college 
as a means of ensuring that their enhanced representation in congress would translate into 
enhanced power in electing an executive.8 Madison and his centralizing colleagues, some 
of whom professed opposition to slavery and its continuation, were willing to make these 
compromises because they saw them as the only means of holding the union together, and 
holding the union together was more important than getting rid of slavery.9
For Slonim, the elements of federalization of most direct importance were the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
enumeration of the powers of the federal government.10 The slave states, particularly the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
vision of a strong central government. Slonim emphasizes the necessary and proper clause, 
the supremacy clause, and the judiciary as stand-ins for the veto and as hedges against the 
restricted latitude of federal government power consequent upon the enumeration of 
powers in the Constitution.11 For Slonim, these things shored up a strong central 
government, and even though Madison considered the convention a failure in its 
immediate aftermath, largely as a result of the rejection of the veto, the antifederalists in 
the ratification debates nonetheless honed in on the necessary and proper clause as granting 
the central government precisely the kind of indefinitely wide range of power that Madison 
had been pushing for, and they began demanding a Bill of Rights for protection against 
such strong government power.12 In chapters six through ten, Slonim narrates select 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????? ??????
in the first session of congress was motivated by his fear that a second convention would 
be called if Congress failed to pass a Bill of Rights.13 For Madison, a second convention 
was a real possibility on account of New York having, upon its ratification of the 
Constitution circulated a letter raising the possibility to the other states. For Slonim, 
?????????? ???????? ??????????? ??????????????? ?????????? ?????? ????Constitution from its 
detractors by assuaging their fears of broadly empowered government, while also 
preserving the energetic government, which he had done so much to fight for in the 
convention.14 ???????? ????????????? ????? ???? ????? ???????????? ???? ??? ???? Tenth 
Amendment, thus ensuring that the powers delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution were understood to include implied powers, granting the government the 
wide latitude that Madison had been advocating for since the confederation period.15
                                                          
 7. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 33?39. 
 8. Id. at 34, 38. 
 9. Id. at 39. 
 10. Id. at 33?45. 
 11. Id. at 33?51. 
 12. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 33?51. 
 13. Id. at 105?95. 
 14. Id. at 163. 
 15. Id. at 195?204. 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
BOROCZ-JOHNSON, L - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:09 AM 
178 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:175 
The??? ???????? ???????????? ???????? ????? ??? ????? ????????? ??? ????????? ??????????????
controversies which precipitated the Philadelphia Convention, the drafting of the 
Constitution, and the debates over ratification which followed. The chief merit of this 
study i?? ????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ???
pushing for an energetic central government from the Confederation period through to the 
beginning of the first congress as one of the central driving forces of the forging of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
nexus around which Madison, his compatriots, and their adversaries confronted one 
another throughout this period is convincing, especially in light of the way Slonim depicts 
the political stakes of implied powers for the various interests groups involved in drafting 
???? ?????????????? ????????? ??????? ????? ????????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????????????
Convention, not from any particularly strong advocacy for states????????, but instead from 
slave states and small states working as coalitional interest groups, may well spark some 
discussion.16
And yet this study is not without its drawbacks. In terms of his source base, Slonim 
sets aside The Federalist, saying that scholars have too heavily relied for their explanations 
of American Federalism on what is essentially a series of polemical essays written in the 
context of the ratification debates in New York. He opts instead to explain the origins of 
Feder?????????????? ?????????????????????Records of the Federal Convention,17 which he 
argues scholars have not examined carefully and systematically enough.18 It is easy to 
grant the first point about scholarly overreliance on The Federalist in explaining just about 
any aspect of the founding period, although Slonim does not illustrate this point or position 
himself relative to other scholars in his introduction. But the familiarity of a great deal of 
????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ?????ar exactly what new 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regard. One area where he does claim to have gathered new insight is his argument for the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????19 His argument is good, 
???? ??? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ?????? ???????????????? Slavery’s Constitution: From 
Revolution to Ratification, which covers this precise subject comprehensively.20
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? terms of unfolding 
the implications of his argument for American constitutional history and theory. Slonim 
expounds a version of originalism which envisions the original meaning of the 
Constitution as consisting primarily in the very strong powers which Madison and his 
compatriots fought so hard to preserve within it. For Slonim, the literature of the 
ratification debates (and therefore The Federalist papers) is not a legitimate source base to 
turn to in order to ascertain the original meaning of the Constitution?this can only be 
done with the records of the Philadelphia Convention, which produced the document.21
On this account, not even Madison after he entered Democratic-Republican opposition to 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 31?51. 
 17. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, VOL. 1 (Max Farrand ed., 2d ed. 1966). 
18. SLONIM, supra note 2, at xvi. 
 19. Id. at 33?39. 
 20. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY?S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009). 
 21. SLONIM, supra note 2, at 31?51. 
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the reigning Federalists in the 1790s was a good originalist. Slonim picks out as one of the 
more important implications of his version of originalism the logical incompatibility of an 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
federal sovereignty as coequal and each untouchable by the other.22 Slonim additionally 
asserts that he has put to rest the ghosts of the Beardian and neo-Beardian theses of the 
American founding, though he gives no adequate explanation of how he thinks he does so 
or of what the stakes are in doing so.23 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
have been developed at greater length, but the book remains useful for its brevity and its 
facility in presenting with great clarity some of the more important conceptual and 
doctrinal issues that structured constitutional debate during the founding era. 
????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????ccount of the making of the 
United States ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????ruction privilege the events and debates ??????????????????24 as this 
????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????? ????????????? ???????- and post-1788 
?????????25 ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Constitution was born, it was unclear what kind of thing it was. Accordingly, it was 
???? ??????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????26 He elaborates that the Constitution 
????? ????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ??? ?? ???? ??? ?????
characteristics that?by delineating what kind of object it is and, from there, what kind of 
contents it possesses and what kind of authority it wields?afford it definitive shape and 
???????????27 ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ?[t]he 
Constitution was born without many of its defining attributes; these had to be provided 
?????????????????????????????28 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
argument, much of which takes shape around intricate analysis of how crucial actors 
imagined the fundamental nature of constitutions generally and the United States Federal 
????????????? ??????????????? ???? ????????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ???????????????? ?????????
sense of how the United States should operate under the authority of the Constitution.29
???? ????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????? ???????????30 of the Constitution as we 
imagine it today (and as, so most originalists would probably claim, everyone in the 
founding generation imagined it) are that the entirety of its prescriptive content is fully 
contained within its text; the government established by the Constitution must be entirely 
structured by and work within the prescriptions of this text, and these prescriptions and 
their meanings are to be ascertained by simply interpreting the text, and looking to some 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 105?19. 
 23. This calls back to his brief debate with Gordon Wood. See generally Shlomo Slonim, Motives at 
Philadelphia: Gordon Wood’s Neo-Beardian Thesis Reexamined, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 527 (1998); Gordon Wood, 
“Motives at Philadelphia”: A Comment on Slonim, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 553 (1998); Shlomo Slonim, Rejoinder 
to Gordon Wood, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 563 (1998). 
 24. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING 
ERA 3 (2018). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.
 27. Id. at 3?4.
 28. Id. at 3. 
29. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 3?4. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
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relevant archival source base (i.e. the records of the Federal Convention, the ratification 
debates, etc.) when it is not clear how a part of the text should be interpreted.31 In a word, 
the nature of the Constitution, and with this, the guiding assumptions about how its 
authority should be understood, its text interpreted, and political action justified on its 
??????? ???? ????????32 ????? ?????????????? ????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ???
???????????that is, the Constitution is fundamentally a complete, written text, tied 
permanently to a given set of archival documents which help clarify and confirm the 
meaning which it already has, but which it does not need in order to be complete and 
sufficient unto itself.33 It is not susceptible of having its meaning altered, transformed, or 
supplemented, except by means of its own provisions for its amendment.34 Gienapp 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and came to define the fundamental nature of the Constitution in the wake of the 
development, by fits and starts, within the United States Federal Government (the early 
???????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????????????? ????????? ?????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ????? ???
justifying political positions on the basis of notions of fixity which were at first inchoate.35
It is not at all clear, in 1790, that fixity would come to be the dominant mode of imagining 
the Constitution.36
?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ?????? ????????? ??? ????
lengthy chapters that survey in a panoramic yet concise way the wide range of elements 
of constitutional imagining at the discursive and practical levels at work in the British 
Atlantic World in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Gienapp demonstrates that 
most American colonists, up to, during, and after the break with Britain, imagined 
constitutions as entities wh?????????????????????????????????????????????37 Constitutions 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????r were 
not rigidly constrained in their nature and operation by constitutions, and these systems 
could transform and develop in ways that would change the constitution itself.38 The lines 
between constitutions and the systems they established were blurry. T??????????????????????
which could be brought forth to justify such transformations could be derived from 
multiple sources not contained within the constitution itself (natural law, moral and social 
philosophy, common law, etc.) but which could legitimately dictate actions not prescribed 
by the constitution in accordance with purposes for the existence of government that 
transcended any kind of constitutional structure.39
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by living under written colonial charters while at the same time they claimed birthright 
British constitutional liberty.40 They lived under layers of imperial and legal authority 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 1. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. at 10?11. 
 34. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 144. 
 35. Id. at 11. 
 36. Id. at 8?15. 
 37. Id. at 23, 34. 
 38. Id. at 23. 
 39. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 27, 28, 34, 41. 
 40. Id. at 31. 
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which were never codified in a clear and universally agreed upon coherent way. But even 
as the Imperial Crisis and the break with Britain occurred as a result of irreconcilable 
differences over how political power should be distributed within these layers of authority, 
even as British colonists became revolutionaries and created from scratch their own written 
constitutions of republican government, the old paradigm of constitutions imagined as 
simultaneously fixed and changing remained in place well into the 1790s, when the United 
States Federal Government was already operating.41 The Constitution imagined as fixed 
and unchanging, rooted in the essentially text-?????????????????????????????????????????????
would not take any kind of fully articulated form until well into the 1790s.42
???? ??? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ??????????bility of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
how British colonists and revolutionaries viewed the instability of language and meaning. 
Gienapp suggests that very few people would have considered it possible to produce a 
written document whose nature, meaning, and authoritative status could be entirely self-
contained and fully measurable according to its own standards.43 This view of the 
fundamental inability of written language to contain in a coherent and stable way 
everything about the structure, function, and ultimate ends of a government was what led 
people like James Wilson to declare it impossible and perhaps even dangerous to try to 
enumerate all the powers that the Federal Legislature ought to have.44 This view also led 
to the adoption of the necessary and proper clause, a purposely broad and vague 
formulation meant to hold open a wide range of possibilities for what could eventually be 
considered constitutional.45
????????????????????????????? argument examines chapter by chapter four major 
debates in the early House of Representatives?the removal debate,46 the debate over 
adoption of the Bill of Rights,47 the Bank Bill controversy,48 and the Jay Treaty 
controversy.49 ?? ?????? ???????? ???????? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????????????50
Gienapp contends that arguments within Congress over narrow political issues could and 
often did quickly balloon into arguments about the fundamental nature of the Constitution 
and how it restricted and legitimated different kinds of legislative and political action. No 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
It is sufficient to say that Gienapp convincingly demonstrates that it was only by the latter 
half of the 1790s that people were self-consciously imagining the Constitution as fixed but 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
political justification in the earliest sessions of the House of Representatives 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 42. 
 42. Id. at 10. 
 43. Id. at 42?49. 
 44. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 60. 
 45. Id. at 60?68. 
 46. Id. at 125?63. 
 47. Id. at 164?201. 
 48. Id. at 202?47. 
 49. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 248?86. 
 50. Id. at 287?324. 
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fundamentally reshaped the way the United States Constitution was imagined. 
Gienapp dedicates an epilogue to unfolding some implications of his argument for 
constitutional theory today. Broadly, his major challenge to originalism is that the strict 
??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????????????????? ????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????????
which took shape almost unintentionally and only by fits and starts throughout the 1790s.51
Becaus????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
years to come. Before the book was even published, Gienapp was engaged in debates with 
originalist scholars, and the implications of his book for originalism have been under 
discussion by big players in the field since his book appeared.52 In light of all of this, I 
want to deemphasize issues of originalism and gesture at some possibilities revealed by 
?????????? ???? for how we think about the United States Constitution, and indeed, 
constitutionalism on a larger, global scale, in the founding era and beyond. The value of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
I would like to raise one of these possibilities by way of a minor criticism. In his 
?????????????? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ??????????????? ??? ?[w]???? ???? ???????????????
??????????? ???? ?????????? ????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????????? ???????????
interests or promoting political programs.53 ????????????????????????????????????which 
the Constitution was used to protect the institution of slavery.?54 However, I would suggest 
that slavery, far more than just one of the myriad political interests at work in the dynamics 
of the founding era, formed a crucial part of the constitutional imaginings of many in the 
founding generation.55 Specifically, discussions in this period about race and whether 
slavery had negatively affected the capacities of the enslaved to be citizens of the United 
States subject to constitutionally established government should affect our view of 
constitutional imagination in this period by revealing it as being embedded within 
enlightenment discourses of stadial theory, barbarism, and civilization.56 Inasmuch as 
Gienapp fixes his gaze so intently on the dubious grounding of originalist theories, he 
misses a wide range of things about constitutional imaginings in the founding era that were 
just as crucial as the elements of fixity and change. I do not mean to criticize anything 
??????????????????????????????????????? take issue with the lines which he draws in terms 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 325?34. 
 52. Gienapp?s post of March 20th, 2017 to Process: A Blog for American History, which detailed his criticisms 
of originalism and some of the themes of The Second Creation against the background of the then-recent 
nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, prompted a response from Randy Barnett in the Washington 
Post. See Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History, PROCESS (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/; Randy Barnett, Challenging the Priesthood of Professional 
Historians, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-priesthood-of-professional-historians/; see also Jack Balkin, 
Symposium on Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation, BALKINZATION (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/symposium-on-jonathan-gienapp-second.html. 
 53. GIENAPP, supra note 24, at 12. 
 54. Id. at 12?13. 
 55. See also MATTHEW CROW, THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEGAL HISTORY, AND THE ART OF RECOLLECTION
(2017). This is an important recent work which makes precisely this case with reference to the constitutional 
thought of Thomas Jefferson. 
 56. See generally MARK SOMOS, AMERICAN STATES OF NATURE: THE ORIGINS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1761?
1775 (2019). This is a very recent work at the time of the composition of this review which thinks through the 
development of American constitutional discourse against the background of enlightenment social theory and 
stadial theories of history. 
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of what gets to count as elements of constitutional imagining as opposed to merely political 
concerns of the actors involved in his story. This line of thinking could very easily extend 
into more broad considerations of how citizenship functioned within founding era 
constitutional imagining, who was qualified for citizenship and who was not, on the basis 
of what the role and purposes of government were taken to be. These issues have certainly 
been covered before, but Gienapp makes it possible to reexamine them in new and 
productive ways. 
????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??? ?????-American 
constitutionalism in the later eighteenth century from the older paradigms he details in his 
first chapters to the new paradigm of written, textual constitutionalism sits alongside new 
and forthcoming work by prominent historian Linda Colley, who is presently engaged in 
asking questions about the hard turn on a global scale to written constitutionalism in the 
later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.57 ????????????????????????????????????????????
very important examination of a process which was occurring in many other places 
throughout the world in contexts of revolution and imperial expansion (including 
American imperial expansion extending well into the nineteenth century). Examining how 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
could add historical depth to the important work of comparative constitutional scholars 
like James Melton, Tom Ginsburg, and Zachary Elkins.58
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
much to criticize about his framing of issues and choices of focus for making his points. 
The Second Creation is certain to generate conversations among legal scholars, historians, 
and political scientists, conversations which will hopefully move in productively 
interdisciplinary directions. 
                                                          
 57. See Linda Colley, Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776–1848, 32 L. & HIST.
REV. 237 (2014); Linda Colley, Writing Constitutions and Writing World History, in THE PROSPECT OF GLOBAL 
HISTORY 160 (James Belich et al. eds., 2016). 
 58. See generally ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (2009). 
